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I. INTRODUCTION
On September 21, 2014, Abu Mohammed al-Adnani, an Islamic
State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) spokesman, broadcasted on Twitter a
speech entitled “Indeed, You Lord is Ever Watchful,” calling upon ISIS
followers to,
If you can kill a disbelieving American or European,
especially the spiteful and filthy French, or an
Australian, or a Canadian, or any other disbeliever from
the disbelievers waging war, including the citizens of the
countries that entered into a coalition against the Islamic
State, then rely upon Allah, and kill him in any manner
*
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School of Law in May 2013. She is currently working towards her L.L.M. in Homeland
and National Security Law at Western Michigan University Thomas M. Cooley School of
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or way however it may be. Do not ask for anyone’s
advice and do not seek anyone’s verdict. Kill the
disbeliever whether he is civilian or military, for they
have the same ruling. Both of them are disbelievers.
Both of them are considered to be waging war [the
civilian by belonging to a state waging war against the
Muslims]. Both of their blood and wealth is legal for you
to destroy, for blood does not become illegal or legal to
spill by the clothes being worn.1
This speech was a direct message to ISIS followers to launch attacks
on civilians in countries opposing ISIS.2
In his speech, al-Adnani declared the military intervention by the
U.S.-led coalition forces as the “final campaign of the crusaders.”3 “It
will be broken and defeated, just as all your previous campaigns were
broken and defeated, except that this time we will raid you thereafter,
and you will never raid us,” al-Adnani stated.4 Al-Adnani urged all
“Muslims to take action and show their support for ISIS through
violence.”5 In concluding the nearly 43-minute speech, al-Adnani
“promised retribution for [the coalition forces] intervention, and to bring
the war to their soil.”6
O Americans, and O Europeans, the Islamic State did
not initiate a war against you, as your governments and
media try to make you believe. It is you who started the
transgression against us, and thus you deserve blame and
you will pay a great price. You will pay the price when
your economies collapse. You will pay the price when
your sons are sent to wage war against us and they return
to you as disabled amputees, or inside coffins, or
mentally ill. You will pay the price as you are afraid of
traveling to any land. Rather you will pay the price as
you walk on your streets, turning right and left, fearing
the Muslims. You will not feel secure even in your
bedrooms. You will pay the price when this crusade of
yours collapses, and thereafter we will strike you in your
1

ISIS Audio Urges Muslims Everywhere to Kill ‘Unbelievers,’ HUFFINGTON POST
(Nov. 21, 2014, 5:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2014/09/21/isis-audio-threatcanada_n_5859062.html.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
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homeland, and you will never be able to harm anyone
afterwards. You will pay the price, and we have
prepared for you what will pain you.7
Threats from the Islamic State (IS) have become increasingly more
profound and numerous over the past couple of years.8 IS has not stopped
at verbal threats but has also acted out against the United States (U.S.)
and other coalition forces through physical acts of violence.9 These
threats and acts of violence have plagued American news outlets
seemingly uninterrupted for the past year. These actions have included
the burning of a Jordanian pilot, Lt. Moath Al-Kasasbeh, in February of
2015,10 the execution of American journalists James Foley and Steven
Sotloff in August 2014,11 the sale of Iraqi children as slaves,12 and the
enslavement, rape, and sale of female captives who were described as
“nonbelievers.”13
While the world looks on at the catastrophe that consumes the
Middle East, many Americans may find themselves wondering why the
U.S. is not being more proactive in dealing with the atrocities being
committed by IS. Why does it seem that the U.S. is sitting idly by
waiting for IS to strike again and again? What many Americans do not
know or understand is that the U.S. and other coalition forces have laws
on how and when they can engage with terrorist groups such as IS.
It is not as simple as the President of the United States quickly and
single-handedly deciding to react to the threats and acts of violence by
IS. In making any decision to act, the President must comply with all
international laws, the laws of armed conflict, and domestic laws.14
These laws provide the legal basis by which the U.S. and other States
7

Id.
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and The Islamic State (IS) are different
names for the same organization. The changes in name are discussed in section II.
9
See infra notes 10-13.
10
Walid Shoebat, Jordanian Pilot Burned Alive by ISIS- Will Not Submit!, FREEDOM
OUTPOST (Feb. 3, 2015), http://freedomoutpost.com/2015/02/jordanian-pilot-burned-isiswill-not-submit/.
11
Kacie Yearout, ISIS vs ISIL- What’s the Difference, WCSH6 (Sept. 11, 2014, 8:04
PM), http://www.wcsh6.com/story/news/local/2014/09/10/isis-vs-isil-islamic-state-iraqsyria/15403133/.
12
Faith Karimi & Greg Botelho, ISIS Putting Price Tags on Iraqi Children, Selling
Them as Slaves, U.N. Says, CNN (Feb. 6, 2015, 4:26 PM), http://www.cnn.com
/2015/02/06/world/isis-children-torture/.
13
Id.
14
This article will not focus on whether the United States has domestic authorization
to act in Syria against the Islamic State. Instead, this article will focus on whether the
United States has a legal basis under the laws of armed conflict to act in Syria against the
Islamic State.
8
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may react to threats and acts of violence by other State and non-State
actors, including when they may act, and even how they may react. One
step outside the bounds of these laws could leave the U.S. and other
coalition forces walking a very thin line between what is and is not
lawful under international law, potentially resulting in vast devastation
for U.S. international relations and for the safety of American troops
abroad.
To understand the current situation between the U.S. and IS, this
article will first describe the history of IS and its ideology, while tracking
its movements and actions through Iraq and Syria since June 2014. Next,
this article answers the question of whether the U.S. has a legal basis
under the laws of armed conflict to act against IS in Syria. In answering
this question, this article analyzes each of the three options that allow for
action under international law: consent, United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) authorization, and self-defense under Article 51 of the United
Nations (U.N.) Charter. Lastly, this article lays out the way forward for
the U.S. in dealing with the continuing presence of and threats by IS.

II. HISTORY OF THE ISLAMIC STATE
IS has an interesting history in comparison to other terrorist
organizations because the organization can be traced back to its
origination. While it is difficult to trace the roots of many terrorist
organizations, IS can be directly traced back to the Sunni terrorist
organization al-Qaeda, and specifically the Iraq faction, al-Qaeda in Iraq
(AQI).15 This faction of al-Qaeda, previously led by Abu Musab alZarqawi, “was responsible for scores of bombings, kidnappings and
beheadings in Iraq following the U.S. invasion” in 2003.16 Al-Zarqawi
was subsequently killed by an American airstrike in 2006, leaving AQI
without a leader.17 Zarqawi’s successor, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, also
known as Abu Ayyub al-Masri, formed the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)
and appointed Abu Omar al-Baghdadi as the leader.18 In 2010, U.S. and
Iraqi forces killed al-Masri in Tikrit.19 Following the deaths of al-Masri

15

Lee Ferran & Rym Momtaz, ISIS Trail of Terror, ABC NEWS (last updated Feb. 23,
2015), http://abcnews.go.com/WN/fullpage/isis-trail-terror-isis-threat-us-25053190.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
COL. S.C. DHIMAN (RET’D.), ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA (ISIS)
RECONCILIATION, DEMOCRACY AND TERROR 130 (2015).
19
2 Most Wanted Al-Qaeda Leaders in Iraq Killed by U.S., Iraqi Forces, FOX NEWS
(Apr 19, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/04/19/iraqi-al-qaeda-leader-killedcountrys-intelligence-team-pm-maliki-says/.

2015-16]

RIGHT TO ACT: UNITED STATES BASIS TO PURSUE ISIS IN SYRIA

5

and Omar al-Baghdadi, a well-known and experienced Iraqi fighter
named Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took over leadership of AQI/ISI.20
In 2007, a large alliance of Iraqi Sunni tribes supported by U.S.
forces fought against the jihadist group in what is now known as the
“Sunni Awakening.”21 AQI/ISI was significantly weakened after this
fight, becoming seemingly non-existent until 2011.22 In an attempt to
regain its power and expand its ranks in 2011, amidst the Syrian Civil
War, AQI/ISI moved into Syria.23 From 2011 to 2013, AQI/ISI regained
power under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and was able to reestablish influence in Iraq.24 At the same time in 2013, al-Baghdadi
changed the group’s name from AQI/ISI to the Islamic State in Iraq and
Syria to “reflect[] its greater regional ambitions.”25
In April 2013, al-Baghdadi “called upon all jihadis in Iraq and the
‘Levant’ to unite under his organization, ISIS, and form an Islamic
state.”26 Abu Muhammad al-Joulani, leader of Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria,
rejected the merger and re-affirmed his allegiance directly to al-Qaeda
leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri.27 In an attempt to intervene and prevent any
unrest between the jihadist groups, al-Zawahiri gave Syria to al-Joulani
and Jabhat al-Nusra, and Iraq to al-Baghdadi and ISIS. However, this
attempt to avoid fracturing failed, which left a wide division among ISIS,
Jabhat al-Nusra, and al-Qaeda.28 While ISIS’s goals and ideology
remain very similar to those of al-Qaeda, the two groups are not
affiliated and do not share a coordinated command relationship or
command structure.29 In fact, there is severe tension and competition
between Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS for local control in Syria.30
In February 2014, al-Zawahiri, on behalf of al-Qaeda, formally
renounced any involvement with ISIS.31 Al-Zawahiri’s renunciation
stemmed primarily from the attempts of ISIS to set up mini-Islamic
20

Ferran & Momtaz, supra note 15 (noting that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is also known
by the name Abu Du’a).
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Dhiman, supra note 18, at 131.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Mark Memmott, Al-Qaida Says It Has No Ties With One Syrian Rebel Force, NAT’L
PUB. RADIO (Feb. 3, 2014, 9:42 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2014/02/03
/270937603/al-qaida-says-it-has-no-ties-with-one-syrian-rebel-force. This complete
renunciation came after al-Zawahiri had warned ISIS to stop its activities in Syria a year
prior.
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states in Iraq and Syria and the imposition of harsh rules on the local
population by ISIS.32 On June 29, 2014, ISIS again changed its name to
the “Islamic State” after “declaring a new caliphate with Abu Bakr alBaghdadi as Caliph Ibrahim and ‘leader of Muslims everywhere.’”33 IS
demanded allegiance from all active jihadist groups, putting IS in direct
competition with al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups.34

III. THE ISLAMIC STATE’S IDEOLOGY
On September 10, 2014, the President of the United States stated,
“Now let’s make two things clear: ISIL is not ‘Islamic.’ No religion
condones the killing of innocents.”35 This statement is somewhat
inaccurate as IS does follow Islam; however, it is a very extreme
interpretation of the Islamic religion that many other Muslims do not
condone or follow.36 Perhaps, statements and understandings such as
this demonstrate the U.S.’s misunderstanding of IS and why the group
acts the way it does.37 It is important to understand IS’s theology and
ideology in order to truly understand IS’s motivations and ultimately
determine if IS poses a threat to the U.S.
IS is very much Islamic. IS follows a movement in Islamic political
thought known as Jihadi-Salafism, or jihadism;38 which it describes as
“the Prophetic methodology.”39 This methodology includes “following
the prophecy and example of Muhammad, in punctilious detail.”40 IS
adheres explicitly to this movement.41 In fact, “The movement is
predicated on an extremist and minoritarian reading of Islamic scripture
that is also textually rigorous, deeply rooted in a pre-modern theological

32

Id.
Dhiman, supra note 18.
34
Id.
35
Barack Obama, Pres. of the United States, Statement by the President on ISIL (Sept.
10, 2014, 9:01 PM), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09
/10/statement-president-isil-1.
36
See Cole Bunzel, From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State,
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (2015), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers
/2015/03/ideology-of-islamic-state-bunzel/the-ideology-of-the-islamic-state.pdf; See also
Graeme Wood, What ISIS Really Wants, THE ATLANTIC (March 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2015/02/what-isis-really-wants/384980/.
37
Id.
38
Bunzel, supra note 36, at 7.
39
Wood, supra note 36.
40
Id.
41
Id.
33
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tradition, and exclusively elaborated by a recognized cadre of religious
authorities.”42
A portion of the movement can be traced back to the Muslim
Brotherhood.43 The Brotherhood believed in “the restoration of the
caliphate as the ideal system of government for the Islamic world, a
popular theme in the earlier 20th century.”44 While the Brotherhood
spoke at length about the caliphate and the need for the Muslim
community to unite under one leader of an Islamic state, in practice, the
Brotherhood did not actually restore a caliphate and, in fact, seemed
indifferent to the idea.45 The connection between IS and the Brotherhood
is evidenced by IS’s June 2014 declaration of al-Baghdadi as Caliph
Ibrahim and leader of Muslims everywhere.46 For IS, uniting the Muslim
community under one leader, creating the Islamic State, and restoring the
caliphate was, and is, an immediate goal of the organization.
The second part of IS’s ideology is traced back to Salafism, “a
primarily theological movement in Sunni Islam . . . .”47 Accordingly,
“Salafism focuses on eliminating idolatry (shirk) and affirming God’s
Oneness (tawhid).”48 Salafis consider themselves to be the only true
Muslims.49 IS follows the theology of Salafi and exemplifies the Salafi
character of the jihadi movement; however, in contrast to al-Qaeda, who
also follows the same theology, IS does so with greater severity.50 In
fact, IS is unwavering in its absolute and uncompromising views on
doctrinal matters, “prioritizing the promotion of an unforgiving strain of
Salafi thought.”51 IS’s extreme adherence to this version of JihadiSalafism can be traced to al-Zarqawi, the founder of AQI, “who studied
theology with the prominent jihadi scholar Abu Muhammad alMaqdisi.”52 The Salafi influences have been present in IS since its
inception, tracing back to al-Baghdadi, al-Muhajir, and the current
spokesperson for IS, al-Adnani.53
IS emphasizes numerous Salafi doctrinal concepts, but the most
prominent is that “all Muslims must associate exclusively with fellow
42

Bunzel, supra note 36, at 7.
Id.
44
Id. at 8.
45
Id. (quoting statements that “Building a caliphate was more a long-term goal than an
immediate goal.”).
46
Wood, supra note 36.
47
Bunzel, supra note 36, at 8.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 9.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 10.
53
Id.
43
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true Muslims and dissociate from anyone not fitting this narrow
definition; failure to rule in accordance with God’s law constitutes
unbelief; all Shi’a Muslims are apostates54 deserving of death; and the
[Brotherhood] and Hamas are traitors against Islam.”55 Compared to alQaeda, IS is much more unbending in its application of Salafism,
resulting in the increased acts of extreme and arbitrary violence, such as
gruesome beheadings.56
IS also differs from al-Qaeda in that it promotes offensive and
defensive jihad.57 Contrarily, al-Qaeda focuses on defensive jihad,
promoting only what it classifies as defensive military acts.58 Offensive
jihad focuses on the “the uprooting of shirk, idolatry, wherever it is
found.”59 In 2007, al-Baghdadi stated, “the end to which fighting the
unbelievers leads is no idolater (mushrik) remaining in the world.”60 AlBaghdadi also emphasized the importance of offensive jihad by stating,
“going after the apostate unbelievers by attacking [them] in their home
territory, in order to make God’s word most high and until there is no
persecution.”61
Finally, IS follows the Islam practice of takfir, or
excommunication.62 IS has committed its organization “to purifying the
world by killing vast numbers of people.”63 Muslim apostates are the
most common victims, and any Christians who resist the IS government
or creation of an Islamic State are also targeted.64 Anyone who does not
adhere to their interpretation of Islam are considered nonbelievers and
are thus subjected to becoming targets.65

54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Id.
Id.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 10.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (defining persecution as meaning idolatry).
Id. at 30.
Wood, supra note 36.
Id.
Id.
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IV. TAKE OVER OF SYRIA AND IRAQ, JUNE 2014 TO PRESENT: AN
OVERVIEW
On June 10, 2014, IS overtook the Iraqi city of Mosul.66 Shortly
after this, IS officially declared itself the Islamic State, due to the number
of captured Iraqi and Syrian territories over which it maintained
control.67 At this time, IS also executed a number of clerics in Mosul
because they would not pledge their allegiance to IS.68 On June 23,
2014, IS also overtook the northern city of Tal Afar and an airport in
Iraq, which ignited the IS expansion into northern Iraq.69 Throughout
July 2014, IS grew and captured more land in Iraq.70
During these months, IS also increased its presence in Syria.71 IS
began to sell oil and gas products from captured Syrian oil fields to Iraq,
attempting “to supply electricity and build state funds in the appointed
‘capital’ of the Islamic State, Raqqa, Syria.”72 Accordingly, “All the
cities between Deir Ezzor city and the Iraq border” fell to IS by July 3,
2014.73 Furthermore, IS claimed to have killed 270 people after seizing
the Shaer gas field of al-Omar.74
On August 7, 2014, the President of the United States authorized
airstrikes against IS after the U.S. learned of the threat to the Yazidi
minority, who were trapped in deplorable and life-threatening conditions
on Mt. Sinjar, Iraq.75 The airstrike allowed tens of thousands of Yazidis
to escape the mountain, but thousands remained trapped as IS continued
its push into northern Iraq.76 Following this event, airstrikes continued
66

AWR Hawkins, U.S. Escalates Military Action in Iraq: A Timeline, BREITBART
NEWS NETWORK (Aug. 24, 2014), http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2014/08/
24/u-s-escalates-military-action-in-iraq-a-timeline/.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id. (explaining that the U.S. increased surveillance over Baghdad due to IS’s growth,
anticipating an attack against the capital city. Drone flights over Baghdad increased from
one drone flight a day to 50).
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
ISIS Fast Facts, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/08/world/isis-fast-facts/ (last
updated July 20, 2015).
74
Id. Al-Omar is the largest oil field in Syria, producing roughly 75,000 barrels of oil
daily.
Group:
ISIS
Takes
Major
Syrian
Oil
Field,
CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/03/world/meast/syria-isis-oil-field/ (last updated July 3
2014).
75
Hawkins, supra note 66 (explaining that IS deemed the Yazidis “devil worshippers”
and chased the Yazidis up Mt. Sinjar in an attempt to extinguish the religious minority.
The only choice the Yazidis had was to stay on the mountain and die of starvation or
thirst or descend the mountain and be slaughtered by the awaiting IS militants).
76
Id.
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with the U.S. strategically targeting IS in various locations.77 The
airstrikes reportedly destroyed or damaged “multiple [IS] ‘fighting
positions’ and ‘checkpoints,’ as well as numerous ‘armed vehicles,’
‘armored personnel carriers,’ and a ‘vehicle-mounted anti-aircraft gun,’
amongst other things.”78
On August 19, 2014, IS released footage of the beheading of
captured American journalist, James Foley.79 IS stated “his beheading
was brought about by Obama’s decision to strike IS positions and
pledged that they would behead others if the strikes continued.”80 At that
time, IS held another American journalist, Steven Sotloff, captive and
indicated he would be next if the U.S. continued the airstrikes.81
Unfortunately, on September 2, 2014, IS released yet another video, this
time of the beheading of Sotloff.82 Then again, on September 13, 2014,
IS posted a video that showed the execution of British aid worker, David
Haines.83 In the video, IS warned the British Prime Minister David
Cameron that the destruction would continue as long as Britain continued
its “evil alliance with America.”84 At the end of the video, IS threatened
the life of Alan Henning, another British citizen held captive by IS.85 On
October 3, 2014, IS released yet another video showing the beheading of
Henning.86 IS threatened the life of another American aid worker, Peter
Kassig, also known as Abdul-Rahman Kassig.87 On November 16, 2014,
IS reported that it beheaded Kassig as it had promised in earlier videos.88
IS continued to plague Iraq throughout November 2014, allegedly
killing 322 members of the Albu Nimr tribe near the town of Hit. 89 In
77

Id.
Id. (reporting that during this time, IS also secured the Iraqi city of Shingal. During
the raid of Shingal, IS took 500 girls and women as “war booty.” IS drove the young,
attractive women out of the city in trucks to be slaves, and killed the older women,
dumping their bodies in the streets).
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
ISIS FAST FACTS, supra note 73.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id. (reporting that IS blamed the beheading on the United Kingdom’s partnering
with the U.S. in the bombing campaign against IS in Syria and Iraq).
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id. In September 2014, the Central Intelligence Agency announced that U.S.
analysts estimated IS to have reached the size of 20,000 to 31,500 fighters across Iraq and
Syria. ISIS Can ‘Muster’ Between 20,000 and 31,500 Fighters, CIA Says, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/11/world/meast/isis-syria-iraq/ (last updated Sept. 12,
2014).
78
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late January 2015, IS demanded $200 million from Japan for the release
of two Japanese hostages, Kenji Goto and Haruna Yukawa. 90 Later in
January 2015, IS posted a video online showing Goto holding a picture
of the beheaded Yukawa. 91 A voice in the video demanded the release
of the terrorist suspect Sajida al-Rishawi from Jordan, in exchange for
the release of Goto. 92 On January 31, 2015, IS released a video showing
the decapitated body of Goto.93
Yet again, on February 3, 2015, IS released a video online depicting
the Jordanian military pilot, Moath al-Kasasbeh, being burned alive
while confined in a cage.94 This atrocity sparked Jordanian airstrikes
against IS positions in Syria that reportedly damaged or destroyed IS
training centers and arms and ammunition caches in the de facto capital
of Raqqa.95 IS threats and acts of violence continued throughout
February 2015, with the confirmation of the death of American hostage,
Kayla Jean Mueller, the beheading of 21 Egyptian Christians on a Libyan
beach, and the parading of 21 Kurdish Peshmerga fighters in cages down
Iraqi streets.96
In March 2015, IS continued its devastation of Iraq and Syria by
destroying antiquities at the Mosul Museum, throwing a man off a
building in Raqqa for allegedly being homosexual, and bulldozing the
site of the ancient city of Nimrud.97 To make matters worse, on March 7,
2015, Abubakar Shekau, leader of Boko Haram, pledged allegiance to
IS.98 Only a few days later, on March 12, 2015, al-Adnani announced
that the caliphate had expanded into western Africa and that al-Baghdadi
had accepted Boko Haram’s pledge of allegiance.99 That same day, IS
bombed the Iraqi army headquarters in north Ramadi, killing at least 40
Iraqi soldiers.100

V. LEGAL BASES UNDER THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT
Now that it is clear who IS is, the ideology it follows, and the
devastation it has caused in the Middle East since June 2014, this article
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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turns to addressing whether the U.S. has a legal basis under the laws of
armed conflict to pursue IS in Syria. Under the law of armed conflict, to
pursue IS within the borders of Syria, the U.S. must either have the
consent of Syria to enter its country, the authorization to use force by the
U.N. Security Council, or a legal basis under one of the theories of selfdefense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. This article first addresses
the basis of consent.

1. Consent
Generally, the use of force by a State in the territory of another State
is prohibited under the U.N. Charter and customary international law.
Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter states:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize
the United Nations to intervene in matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state
or shall require the Members to submit such matters to
settlement under the present Charter; but this principle
shall not prejudice the application of enforcement
measures under Chapter VII.101
Simply put, this means that if a State requests the assistance of a
fellow State or ally, that fellow State or ally is free to use force within the
boundaries of the requesting nation.
Currently, Syria has not expressly given the U.S. permission to go
after IS within its borders.102 In fact, in a press conference held on
August 25, 2014, the Syrian foreign minister, Walid al-Moallem, warned
the U.S. “not to conduct airstrikes inside Syria against the Islamic State
without the Syrian government’s consent,” stating that “any such attack
would constitute an act of aggression.”103 While these comments seemed
to pre-empt any U.S. action in Syria, al-Moallem also stated that “Syria
is ready to co-operate and co-ordinate on the regional and international
level in the war on terror, but any effort to combat terrorism should be
co-ordinated with the Syrian government.”104
It remains clear that Syria has not expressly given consent for the
U.S. to act within its borders. However, some legal scholars argue that
101
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Syria may have given implied consent105 based on statements from
Syrian government spokespersons, that “we are facing an enemy. We
should cooperate.”106 To support this argument, international legal
scholars point to the fact that “Syria has made no effort to interfere with
the operations in spite of the US notifying it of the attacks prior to their
launch.”107 In fact, in late 2014, Syria submitted several letters to the
U.N. complaining about bombings by Israel, hostile actions by Turkey
within its borders, U.N. support for non-government organizations
providing humanitarian assistance, and the arming and training of rebel
groups within its borders, but Syria failed to complain about the U.S.
airstrikes against IS.108 The absence of complaints to the U.N. over U.S.
airstrikes coupled with statements from Syrian government officials, like
“U.S.-led air strikes against militants are going in the ‘right direction’
because the [Syrian] government had been informed before they started
and they were not hitting civilians or Syrian military targets,”
demonstrates that Syria may very well be implying consent based on its
actions, or inability to act, and statements.109
Additionally, on September 29, 2014, al-Moallem addressed the
U.N. General Assembly and many observers stated that his comments
“appeared to give tacit approval of U.S. and Arab airstrikes in
Syria.”110Al-Moallem specifically stated that IS was “unleashed like a
monster against Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon. Let us together stop this
ideology and its exporters.”111 Anything that remained tacit in alMoallem’s September 29, 2014 comments to the U.N. Assembly became
much clearer in an interview with Associated Press on that same day. In
that interview, al-Moallem stated that “the U.S.-led bombing campaign
should be expanded to target other militant groups besides the Islamic
State group, noting that the fight against terrorism has aligned the Syrian
105
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regime with its Western and Arab opponents in a fight against a common
enemy.”112
Furthermore, U.S. strikes against IS obviously benefit Syria because
IS continues to be one of the Syrian government’s most powerful
opponents; therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the Syrian
government does not vehemently oppose the U.S. operations taking place
within its borders.113 It must be noted that making an argument based on
implied consent would be very contentious amongst the international
community, as the theory of implied consent is not codified in
international law and the theory is not widely accepted by the
international legal community.114 Interestingly enough, the U.N. General
Secretary, Ban Ki-Moon, addressing the U.S. basis for airstrikes in Syria
on September 23, 2014, stated “I am aware that today’s strikes were not
carried out at the direct request of the Syrian Government, but I note that
the Government was informed beforehand.”115
All in all, the U.S. relationship with Syria, particularly with regard to
the issue presented by IS, is murky at best. One thing is very clear: Syria
has not expressly consented to U.S. action within its borders against IS.
On another note, there is an argument to be made that based upon Syria’s
actions, or inability to act, public statements, and acquiesce to U.S.
airstrikes in Syria, Syria has effectively given implied consent for the
U.S. to act within its borders to pursue IS. Whether the international
legal community would largely accept this argument remains a mystery,
but the U.S. does have a compelling argument based upon the evidence
that exists of Syria’s acquiesce to U.S. action.

2. U.N. Security Council Authorization
The second basis under which a State may enter another sovereign
State, and act without consent, is pursuant to UNSC authorization.
Article 24 of the U.N. Charter states “Members confer on the Security
Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace
and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this
responsibility the Security Council acts on their own behalf.”116 Article
43 states “All Members of the [U.N.], in order to contribute to the
maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make
available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a
112
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special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities,
including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining
international peace and security.”117 In short, the UNSC maintains
international peace and security throughout the world and, in return,
Member States agree to abide by and carry out UNSC resolutions.118
The UNSC has not issued a United Nations Security Resolution
(UNSCR) directly giving Member States of the U.N. Charter the
authority to use force in Syria against IS; however, the UNSC has issued
a couple other resolutions that deal primarily with the continuing
presence of IS in the Middle East. What is missing from these resolutions
is the ever important language of “‘all necessary means to restore
international peace and security and request[s] all States to provide
appropriate support to do so.”119 When this language is present in a
Security Council resolution, the Member States are authorized to use
force to carry out the central intent of the resolution.120 Without this
language, the Member States are not authorized to use force. If they seek
to use force, it must be justified by one of the other two legal bases
provided for by the law of armed conflict, or they risk being in violation
of international law.
On August 15, 2014, the UNSC passed UNSCR 2170, dealing
directly with extremist groups located in Iraq and Syria.121 This was one
of the few resolutions passed since 2014, in an effort to combat the
overwhelming and disastrous presence of extremist groups in Iraq and
Syria, specifically IS. This Resolution expressly provided for “all United
Nations Member States to act to suppress the flow of foreign fighters,
financing and other support to Islamist extremist groups in Iraq and
Syria.”122 The UNSC “condemn[ed] in the strongest terms what it called
‘gross, systematic and widespread abuse’ of human rights by the Islamic
State of Iraq and the Levant.”123 This resolution was unanimously
adopted by the Member States.124
In addition to calling on Member States to “take national measures to
suppress the flow of foreign terrorist fighters” and the UNSC’s
willingness to issue sanctions for any States found to be in violation of
117
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the Resolution, UNSCR 2170 also added six persons to its terrorist
sanctions list.125 Al-Baghdadi, the leader of IS, was not included on the
list, because he has been on the terrorist sanctions list since 2011.126
UNSCR 2170 included bold language cautioning the extremist groups in
Iraq and Syria to stop the deplorable actions they were committing
against humanity, and urging the other Member States to stop any
assistance, whether directly or indirectly, to these groups.127 However,
what this Resolution did not provide for was the right to use force against
the extremist groups for the crimes they were committing against
humanity.
Most recently, the UNSC passed UNSCR 2199 on February 12,
2015.128 This Resolution targets funding streams for the Islamic State.129
The USCR urged “global cooperation ‘to impair, isolate and
incapacitate’ terrorist threats.”130 The UNSC condemned those buying
oil from the Islamic State, banned all trade in looted antiquities from Iraq
and Syria, and called upon States to end ransom payments.131 The
Russian-led resolution was adopted unanimously, garnering the support
of 35 countries.132 Jackie Northam, reporter for National Public Radio,
characterized this Resolution as “a rare show of unity between the U.S.
and Russia, which is the measure’s primary sponsor.”133 Russia’s
ambassador to the U.N., Vitaly Churkin, said, “the resolution was an
important step to suppressing the terrorist threat that’s felt far beyond
Syria, Iraq and other nations in the Middle East.”134
The Resolution condemns any trade, directly or indirectly, with the
extremist group, particularly trade of oil, oil products and modular
refineries.135 The UNSC emphasized that any trade by a country with IS
would be interpreted as support by that country of IS and that country
would face possible sanctions from the UNSC.136 The UNSC further
recognized that “oilfields, as well as other infrastructure such as dams
125
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and power plants, controlled by ISIL . . . ‘are generating a significant
portion of the groups’ income, alongside extortion, private foreign
donations, kidnap ransoms and stolen money from the territory they
control.”137
The UNSC has taken steps to combat the issues present in Iraq and
Syria due to the overwhelming presence of IS and other extremist groups
in the region. However, it has failed to go so far as to authorize the use of
force in the fight against IS in Iraq and Syria. While it is clear that the
Council is directing its efforts at combating IS in the most civil and nonhostile way possible, ultimately, the resolutions it has passed do not seem
to be affecting the operations of IS, as it continues to plague Syria and
Iraq. IS continues to overrun Syria, continues to recruit foreign fighters
to build its militia, and continues to cause the death of innocent civilians
in the name of Islam. Furthermore, there has not been any indication by
the UNSC thus far, regarding if and when an authorization for the use of
force will occur.

3. Article 51
Article 51 states “[n]othing in this present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack
occurs against a Member of the [U.N.], until the Security Council has
taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security . . . .”138 Article 51 requires that an armed attack occur before a
State can act in self-defense.139 But that begs the question, what is an
“armed attack?” While there is no agreed upon definition, it is important
to look at the facts and circumstances of each individual attack to assess
whether an armed attack has occurred.140 For example, the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) “decided that Nicaragua’s provision of arms to the
opposition in El Salvador was not an armed attack.”141 To qualify as an
armed attack, the attack must be more than isolated criminal acts against
a state’s citizens no matter how brutal the attacks may be.142
Some members of the international legal community, to include the
United States, also support a position that a State can attack in self137
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defense when an armed attack is imminent, but has not yet occurred.143
The debate of what does or does not constitute an “armed attack” is not
the focus of this article. For the purposes of this article, it is important to
know and understand what Article 51 states and how that language plays
into the analysis of whether self-defense is appropriate in any given
situation, specifically whether the U.S. has a legal basis to enter Syria to
pursue IS.
There are varying theories of self-defense such as the inherent right
to self-defense, anticipatory self-defense, interceptive self-defense,
preventive self-defense and collective self-defense.144 This section will
focus primarily on collective and preventive self-defense, as those are the
most likely bases for the legal justification to use force in Syria by the
U.S. against IS. This article will not address the inherent right of selfdefense by the U.S. to use force against IS within Syria because at this
point the U.S. has not expressed a concern that IS has facilitated an
armed attack against the U.S. or that there is an imminent threat of an
armed attack against the U.S. by IS. In fact, the U.S. has repeatedly
claimed that IS does not present an immediate threat to the U.S.
homeland.145 Furthermore, “many experts note that the Islamic State,
despite its clever anti-U.S. bluster to lure the United States into attacking
it, is more a threat to the Middle East and neighboring countries than it is
to U.S. territory” because IS “is focused on establishing an Islamic state
in Iraq and Syria rather than attacking the U.S.”146
This same argument applies to the theory of anticipatory selfdefense.147 Without evidence that IS poses an imminent threat to the
U.S., the U.S. does not have the right to claim anticipatory self-defense
against IS within the borders of Syria.148 Without an armed attack or an
imminent armed attack, the U.S. has no legal justification to rely on the
inherent right of self-defense or anticipatory self-defense to use force
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against IS within the Syrian borders. For these reasons, these two
theories are not addressed in detail as part of this article.
In discussing these varying bases for self-defense, it is important to
remember that the U.S. has articulated on many occasions that it believes
there exists an international legal basis for the U.S. to act in Syria against
IS. For example, Samantha Power, U.S. ambassador to the U.N., stated
“the United States has the legal right to launch Syrian strikes without the
[U.N. Security Council’s] explicit backing.149 Consistent with the U.N.
Charter, we [think] – it would depend on the facts and circumstance of
any particular strike in Syria – that we have the legal basis we need.”150
National Security Council spokesperson, Caitlin Hayden also stated,
“with respect to international law, the specific basis will depend on the
particular facts and circumstances related to any specific military actions,
but we believe that we will have a basis for taking action.”151 In
addition, statements made by Iraqi and U.S. representatives to the U.N.
indicated “the current operations in Syria against ISIS are being justified
on the basis of collective self-defen[s]e.”152

a. Collective Self-Defense
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter recognizes a right of collective selfdefense.153 Collective self-defense is applicable when a State, who has
the right to act in inherent self-defense, requests the assistance of another
State because the requesting State is unable or unwilling to exercise its
inherent right of self-defense on its own.154 To exercise the right of
collective self-defense, the State entitled to act in inherent self-defense
must explicitly request assistance from other States.155 The ICJ in the
Nicaragua case discussed briefly above, “refused to acknowledge the
U.S.’s claim to collective self defense because El Salvador had not
officially requested such help.”156 The ICJ stated:
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It is also clear that it is the State which is the victim of
an armed attack which must form and declare the view
that it has been so attacked. There is no rule in
customary international law permitting another State to
exercise the right of collective self-defense on the basis
of its own assessment of the situation. Where collective
self-defense is invoked, it is to be expected that the State
for whose benefit this right is used will have declared
itself to be the victim of an armed attack.157
The U.S. government received a request from the Iraqi government
explicitly requesting assistance from the U.S. to fight against IS.158
According to the U.S. notification to the U.N., Iraq specifically requested
assistance from the U.S. to “lead international efforts to strike [IS] sites
inside Syria to suppress continuing attacks on Iraq and protect Iraqi
citizens.”159 Based on the request from Iraq, the U.S. is acting in selfdefense on behalf of Iraq against the ongoing threat posed by IS.160 The
threat largely emulates from IS forces within the borders of Syria and
Syria’s seemingly inability or unwillingness to address the IS problem
within its own border.161
The question of whether Syria is unable or unwilling to deal with the
threat posed by IS is highly debated. Although Syria has not expressly
stated that it is “unable or unwilling” in dealing with the threat posed by
IS, as stated in the section of this article dealing with consent, its inaction
to deal with the threat posed by IS does suggest that it is unable to.162
The “unable or unwilling test” is a controversial part of international law,
though it is considered a well-settled part of the U.S. government’s legal
position.163 In fact, the U.S. relied on this theory when it entered
Pakistan, without approval, during the operation to kill Osama bin
Laden.164 In a letter dated September 23, 2014, addressed to the U.N.
Secretary General, the U.S. demonstrated support for the “unable or
unwilling” test, by stating that “states must be able to defend themselves,
157
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in accordance with the inherent right of individual and collective selfdefense as reflected in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, when, as is the
case here, the government of the state where the threat is located is
unwilling or unable to prevent the use of its territory for such attacks.”165
Comments like those made by Ban Ki-Moon, in his statement on
September 23, 2014, admitting that “the strikes took place in areas no
longer under the effective control of that [Syrian] Government,” support
the position that Syria is unable to deal with the threat posed by IS.166
Ki-Moon further stated, “I think it is undeniable – and the subject of
broad international consensus – that these extremist groups pose an
immediate threat to international peace and security.”167 U.S. Secretary
of State, John Kerry, recognized the inability of the Syrian government
to handle the continued threat posed by IS within its borders, stating “We
[U.S.] are going to do what they [Syria] haven’t done, what they had
plenty of opportunity to do, which is to take on ISIL and to degrade it
and eliminate it as a threat.”168 While the U.S may have an uphill battle
in persuading the international legal community to accept this argument,
there is evidence to support the argument that Syria is unable to handle
the threat posed by IS within its borders.
Because Iraq has requested U.S. assistance in combating the threat
posed by IS, and there exists a strong argument that Syria is unable to
combat the threat posed by IS with its borders, the U.S. has a strong legal
argument that it can pursue IS in Syria, relying on the theory of
collective self-defense.169 “So long as the force used is necessary to
protect against the direct threat that [IS] posed to Iraq, and that the
amount and nature of force is proportionate to suppressing that threat,”
then U.S. actions in Syria are legally supportable under the law of armed
conflict.170 Given that IS has rapidly advanced in Iraq, due in large part
to the support flowing into Iraq from Syria, and the Syrian government is
unable to handle IS on its own, there exists a necessity for the U.S. to act
in defense of Iraq.171
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At first, the U.S. only targeted IS bases, training camps, and IScontrolled transit points into Iraq.172 These strikes and any other strikes
on similar targets are and would be proportionate to suppressing the
threat posed by IS to Iraq.173 However, since January 2015, the U.S. has
conducted airstrikes and targeted IS controlled areas of Syria that are not
near the Iraq-Syria border.174 This raises the question of whether this is
legally permissible under the basis of collective self-defense.
Under this theory, it is quite clear that the U.S. can do what is
necessary to secure Iraq’s border with Syria and protect Iraqi civilians
from IS. However, it becomes more complex when determining whether
the U.S. may act in Syria. As discussed previously, because it is
extremely likely that Syria is unable to combat IS on its own, this
provides the U.S. the ammunition to argue that it has a legal basis to act
on behalf of Syria under the theory of collective self-defense. This
theory allows the U.S. to act within Syria’s borders so long as the attacks
meet the other requirements of international law. While the U.S. has not
expressly stated upon which basis it is acting under in conducting
airstrikes in Syria, neither the UNSC nor any other country or
international group have questioned its actions, to include the Syrian
government. If questions were to be raised, it is likely that the U.S. has a
good argument under the theory of collective self-defense to justify its
actions in Syria.

b. Preventive Self-Defense
The theory of preventive self-defense applies when a State “acts to
prevent a potential attack before it is imminent or even capable of being
launched.”175 While Israel justified its use of force against Iraq in 1981
using this theory of self-defense, it was not widely accepted by the
international community until twenty years later, when President George
W. Bush articulated U.S. support of preventive self-defense in the 2002
U.S. National Security Strategy.176 The strategy stated:
We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their
terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use
weapons of mass destruction against the United States
and our allies and friends . . . .We must adapt the
concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and
172
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objectives of today’s adversaries . . . The United States
has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to
counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The
greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and
the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory
action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains
as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To
forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries,
the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.177
Even though preventive self-defense appears to be a viable option at
first glance, due to previous overreaching and abuse of this doctrine by
the Bush Administration during the unprovoked invasion of Iraq in 2002,
present reliance on preventive self-defense to justify the use of force is
frowned upon by the international community due to the high probability
of abuse.178 This would not be a viable option for the U.S. since there
would likely be much turmoil and animosity in the international
community over the U.S.’s use of this theory to re-enter a Middle Eastern
country, when there is not an apparent armed attack or imminent threat
of attack against the U.S.

VI. WAY FORWARD
The current state of affairs between the U.S., Syria, Iraq, IS, other
coalition forces, and the U.N. is in a constant state of flux. On any given
day, the relationship between all of these parties could drastically
change, causing the facts to provide a legal basis for intervention under
the inherent right of self-defense, anticipatory self-defense, or the
issuance of UNSCR.179 The analysis under any one of these distinct
bases is very fact and circumstance dependent. Due to the facts and
circumstances that currently present themselves, the two legitimate
arguments that can be made under international law by the U.S. to act in
Syria to pursue IS are: 1) Syria has given implied consent to the U.S. to
act within its borders to combat IS; or 2) the U.S. has the right to use
collective self-defense on behalf of Iraq. Now, it is important to keep in
177

Id. at 23-24. (citing U.S. National Security Council, National Security Strategy
(Sept. 2002)), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/
2002/nss5.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2015).
178
Id.
179
Ashley Deeks, U.S. Airstrikes Against ISIS in Syria? Possible International Legal
Theories, LAWFARE BLOG (Aug. 23, 2014, 3:04 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/
08/us-airstrikes-against-isis-in-syria-possible-international-legal-theories/.

24

U. MIAMI NAT’L SECURITY & ARMED CONFLICT L. REV.

[Vol. VI:1

mind that acting under collective self-defense presents limited options of
what the U.S. may do to further Iraq’s security. In sum, the U.S. has a
legal basis under the law of armed conflict to act within Syria’s borders
to combat the ongoing threats posed by IS.

